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USING FRAMEWORK STATUTES TO FACILITATE U.S. TREATYMAKING
What can be learned from the exemplary Congressional-Executive cooperation achieved in
the negotiation, approval, and implementation of new U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs)? The
significance of these FTAs for economic growth and international trade policy has been examined.1
Yet insufficient attention has been given to the legal implications of this development for how the
United States makes international commitments. Although U.S. trade agreements are gaining
approval through enactment of a law, most other important U.S. international agreements face a
more daunting challenge of gaining the “advice of consent” of the U.S. Senate by a two-thirds vote.
In my view, the method used for trade is a good model for how U.S. negotiating and treatymaking
could be carried out in other fields of international law. So far, little discussion has occurred about
the value of such mimesis for U.S. Constitutional practice.
This comment seeks to open that constitutional door. Part I introduces the topic by
contrasting the reliable process used for U.S. trade agreements to the less predictable process used
for other treaties. The next two parts examine some key issues in considering a broader use of the
trade agreement method. Part II addresses constitutionality and Part III the democratic acceptability
of such a change. Part IV explains the centrality of a framework statute to enable the President and
Congress to work in tandem in making international commitments. Part V concludes.
I. INTRODUCTION

This is the final draft version of the paper published in the American Journal of International Law,
October 2004.
1

See generally FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS. U.S. STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES (Jeffrey J. Schott ed.,

2004).

2

During the first seven months of 2004, the United States consummated bilateral FTAs with
Australia and Morocco, and a regional FTA with the Dominican Republic and Central America.
The U.S.-Australia FTA was agreed to on February 8, 2004, signed on May 18, formally submitted
to Congress on July 6, and by July 15, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate had
adopted legislation to “approve” and implement the FTA.2 The U.S.-Morocco FTA was agreed to
on March 2, 2004, signed on June 15, formally submitted to Congress on July 15, and by July 22,
the Congress had adopted implementing legislation.3 The United States-Dominican RepublicCentral America FTA has been signed, and the timing of its submission to Congress depends on the
forthcoming U.S. elections.
More FTAs are on the way. The United States is finalizing an FTA with Bahrain, and is in
various stages of negotiation with Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Thailand, and the five-nation
Southern Africa Customs Union. Each FTA will get a prompt Congressional vote so long as the
agreement is entered into before June 1, 2005, the expiration date in the 2002 law granting the
President “Trade Promotion Authority.”4
The Congressional vote tallies show the success of the trade agreement approval process.
Trade Promotion Authority was initially employed in 2003 when the Congress approved FTAs with
Chile and Singapore by substantial majorities—over 63 percent in the House and over 67 percent in

2

See United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108–286, §2

(2004).
3

See United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-__

(2004).
4

19 USCS § 3803(a) (2004). This deadline may be extended to 2007 by the President.

3

the Senate. The recent FTAs with Australia and Morocco gained even greater support, over 74
percent in the House and over 83 percent in the Senate.
These huge majorities are especially impressive when one recalls that the law providing
Trade Promotion Authority took many years to come to fruition.5 Similar trade authority, then
called “fast track,” 6 was granted by Congress in 1988, and was used to approve and implement U.S.
participation in the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Unfortunately, after the expiration of that authority in 1994,
Congressional politics prevented a renewal until 2002. As a consequence, the intervening eight
years were largely fallow for new two-way trade liberalization.
When President George W. Bush came into office, he sought trade negotiating authority. In
a speech to business leaders in mid-2001, he explained:
But in order for me to be effective on trade, I need trade promotion authority. I
need the ability to speak with a single voice for our country. I need to have the
capacity as an administration to negotiate free trade agreements without the

5

See Laura L. Wright, Trade Promotion Authority: Fast Track for the Twenty-First Century, 12

WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. 979 (2004).
6

The term “fast track” was used in the 1988 law authorizing trade negotiations, but that term was

dropped in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002. Compare 19 USCS § 2903(b)
(2004) with 19 USCS § 3803 (2004). Apparently, the term “fast track” was thought to carry too
much political baggage.
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fear of them being undermined. Otherwise, our trading partners are going to
be confused and concerned about an honest and open dialog.7
Following some close votes, the Congress succeeded in crafting a multi-step framework for new
trade negotiations. Specifically, the new statute: (1) gave the President a negotiating mandate, (2)
set 17 principal U.S. negotiating objectives, (3) required regular consultation between the Executive
Branch and the Congress, (4) set timetables for various notifications and reports to the Congress, (5)
solicited reports from numerous advisory committees, and (6) guaranteed prompt House and Senate
consideration, without amendment, of implementing legislation, as prepared by the President
following consultations with the relevant Congressional committees.8
This temporary procedure supplements the President’s inherent negotiating authority. Under
Article II, section 2, clause 2 of U.S. Constitution, “He shall have power, by and with the advice
and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur . . .
.”9 Thus, the President may choose to submit trade agreements to the Senate as Article II “treaties,”
and throughout American history, many agreements on “Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,”
investment, and trade relations have gone through the “advice and consent” process. In recent
decades, however, the President has not exercised the Article II option for trade agreements.
Instead, he has sent trade agreements to the House and Senate for approval and implementation
through the legislative process.
7

Remarks to the Business Roundtable, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS. GEORGE W. BUSH 2001,

Vol. 1, at 705, 708.
8

19 USCS § 3801 et seq. (2004).

9

U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2. Hereinafter, this clause will be referred to as “Article II.”
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The contemporary U.S. practice is for trade agreements to be considered on a fast track and
non-trade agreements on the slower track of Senate “advice and consent.”10 This divergence is
puzzling. Trade agreements are negotiated and approved using framework procedures that promote
cooperation between the Executive and Legislative branches. Yet other topics of international
cooperation are pursued without a statutory framework and sometimes without cooperation between
the President and the Senate. These diverging approaches can lead to unequal results.
The slower track of Senate “advice and consent” sometimes works to effectuate new
international engagements, but sometimes it fails.11 One recurring problem is Senate inaction.
Under Senate rules, no expedited procedure exists whereby a President can call for a vote on a

10

U.S. Presidents use a variety of authorities to achieve new international agreements. The most

prominent are:
1. a “sole executive agreement” based on the President’s independent Constitutional
authority,
2. an agreement pre-authorized by Congress,
3. an agreement submitted to Congress for review and approval,
4. an agreement submitted by the President to the Senate for advice and consent.
This comment discusses the possibility of substituting the third method for many international
agreements now processed using the fourth method.
11

LEE HAMILTON (WITH JORDAN TAMA), A CREATIVE TENSION. THE FOREIGN POLICY ROLES OF THE

PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 65 (2002).
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resolution of ratification. Another impediment may be a need for Congress to act on implementing
legislation.12
The field of environmental law provides good examples of ongoing dysfunctions in the
treaty ratification process. Consider the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. This Convention was consented to by the
Senate in 1992, but remains unratified by the United States because even a dozen years later, the
Congress has not approved implementing legislation.13 The Basel Convention is an unusual episode
in that Senate consent occurred despite the absence of implementing legislation. A more common
outcome is for the Senate to withhold consent while awaiting the adoption of such legislation. That
is the predicament of the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the 1998
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals
and Pesticides in International Trade.14 In other instances, an environment convention is sent to the

12

Chandler P. Anderson, The Extent and Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power under the

Constitution, 1 AJIL 636, 648 (1907) (noting the sanction of custom for the proposition that where
certain powers are expressly confided by the Constitution to Congress, the concurrence of both
houses of Congress is necessary in order to make effective a treaty undertaking).
13

Linda Roeder, Bush Administration Plans to Introduce Basel Convention Legislation in Congress,

DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), June 11, 2004, at A-29.
14

Pat Phibbs, Joining Environmental Treaties Prompts Sharp Debate in the United States, DAILY

REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), July 19, 2004, at C-1. Even though the Rotterdam Convention is
about international trade, no special procedure exists to expedite implementing legislation.
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Senate for consent, but then the convention is never brought to a vote. That was what happened to
the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, a widely-ratified treaty with 188 state parties.
Securing Senate action on human rights conventions can also prove difficult. Consider the
International Labor Organization’s Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organise (No. 87). That convention was sent to the Senate in 1949, but continues to be
detained in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. One wonders whether 34 senators would
have the temerity to vote against this fundamental labor rights convention if it were brought to a
vote. A similar fate has befallen the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). That Convention has been waiting for Senate
consideration since 1980. In some instances, the prospects for gaining Senate consent and/or
Congressional implementation are so daunting that a treaty is never even transmitted to the Senate.
That is the story with the 1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. In the absence of a
process for working through the myriad issues of state versus federal law and in the face of
opposition from then-Senator Jesse Helms, no viable path existed to achieve U.S. ratification.
In some instances, fundamental human rights treaties do emerge from the Senate, but only
after unconscionable delay. The most poignant tale of survival occurred with the International
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Convention was
transmitted to the Senate in 1949, but not consented to until February 1986. This consent was
subject to a declaration that the instrument of ratification not be deposited until after Congress
adopted implementing legislation. Doing so took until November 1988, and then the United States
finally joined the Convention. The 1984 Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment suffered considerable, though much less, delay in the
Congress. The Convention was transmitted to the Senate in 1988, and consented to in 1990. The

8

enactment of implementing legislation was not completed until 1994, however, after which the
United States ratified the Convention.
The need to coordinate treaty consent with implementing legislation is a common problem,
and can be seen in the processing of the 1993 Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect to Intercountry Adoption. That Convention was transmitted to the Senate in
June 1998.15 Separately, the House and Senate began writing implementing legislation. The two
pathways converged on September 20, 2000, when the Senate adopted both the resolution of
ratification and the House-passed implementing bill.16 This elapsed time of 27 months may be better
than average for international agreements that need implementing legislation, but that odyssey is
significantly longer than the short excursions enjoyed by FTAs.
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea is a multiplex treaty with important
implications for security, transportation, environment, and human rights. The Convention began its
Senate voyage in 1994. Finally, in early 2004, it was unanimously reported by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, but so far, a full Senate vote has not been scheduled.17
The different procedural approach for trade versus other agreements is perplexing, and yet a
close look at current U.S. practice reveals a deeper mystery. Following the dictates of Trade
Promotion Authority, the new FTAs negotiated by the Bush Administration do far more than open

15

Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Implementation of Intercountry Adoption Convention, 95 AJIL 416 (2001).

16

146 CONG. REC. S8866 (Sept. 20, 2000).

17

See Steve Hirsch, Law of the Sea Treaty Getting Submerged, NAT’L J., Apr. 10, 2004, at 1126-27;

Former Legal Advisers’ Letter on Accession to the Law of the Sea Convention, Editors’ Note, 98
AJIL 307 & n. 1 (2004)

9

up trade. As the chief U.S. trade negotiator explains, “America’s FTAs break new ground—they
establish prototypes for liberalization in areas such as services, e-commerce, intellectual property
for knowledge societies, transparency in government regulation, and better enforcement of labor
and environmental protections.”18 The Australia FTA addresses additional areas such as
pharmaceuticals, law enforcement cooperation, investment, and anti-corruption.19 These areas of
law singularly are often the object of Article II treaties. Yet when these issues are wrapped into an
FTA, the President and Senate see a way to bypass the Constitution’s advice and consent
requirements.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY
Part II provides an overview of two constitutional issues involved in bypassing Senate
advice and consent: First, can an Congressional-Executive agreement properly serve as a substitute
for a treaty approved via the Article II procedure? Second, and if so, could the method used for
trade agreements be extended to other agreements?
The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States defines “CongressionalExecutive agreements” as international agreements in which Congress authorizes the President to

18

Robert B. Zoellick, Our Credo: Free Trade and Competition, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2003, at A10.

19

U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004 (not yet in force), Annex 2-C, art. 6.5, chap.

11, art. 17.9, art. 17.10, art. 22.5, available at http://www.ustr.gov. Some of the provisions on
pharmaceuticals drew controversy. Marilyn Chase & Sarah Lueck, In New Trade Pacts, U.S. Seeks
To Limit Reach of Generic Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2004, at A1; Elizabeth Becker & Robert
Pear, Trade Agreement May Undercut Importing of Inexpensive Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2004,
at A1.
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negotiate and conclude an agreement or in which Congress approves an agreement already
concluded by the President.20 According to the Restatement, “the prevailing view is that the
Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every
instance.”21 The Restatement does not dwell on the distinction between an international agreement
pre-authorized by Congress and an agreement directly approved by Congress.
This distinction gained attention in Bruce Ackerman and David Golove’s masterful study Is
NAFTA Constitutional?

22

The authors typologize the two forms of Congressional-Executive

agreement and use the terms “ex ante” and “ex post” to distinguish them.23 They call the latter type
the “modern congressional-executive agreement.”24 In their account of the history, the first modern
agreement was set in motion in 1923 when the Congress tasked the World War Foreign Debt
Commission to negotiate settlements with countries owing debts to the United States, with those
agreements then to be considered for “approval” by the Congress.25
20

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e

(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
21

Id.

22

BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, IS NAFTA CONSTITUTIONAL? (1995).

23

Id. at 24, 27.

24

Id. at 2.

25

Id. at 40-41. Nine years after the 1923 law, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign

Affairs gave a presentation at the ASIL annual meeting where he pointed out this “striking instance
of international agreement authorized by Congress” and noted how that procedure was “ignoring the
rule of treaty-making with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate.” J. Charles Linthicum, The

11

Ackerman and Golove seem to apply the term “modern Congressional-Executive
agreement” to any agreement subsequently approved by the Congress rather than reserving it for
those approved pursuant to a framework analogous to the one used in the war debt statute. For
example, they note the significance of Congressional approval of the Bretton Woods Agreements
Act.26 In that episode, no prior negotiating mandate existed.
In my view, the truly modern form of Congressional-Executive agreement originates with a
framework statute that does three things: (1) it invites the Executive to undertake specified
negotiations, (2) it promises Congressional consideration of a law to approve the resulting
agreement, and (3) it offers expedited House and Senate procedures. Trade Promotion Authority is
the fullest development of such a statute. It marries an advance negotiating mandate from the
Congress to a procedure for an ex post vote on any agreement transmitted to the Congress.
The question of the constitutional validity of a decision by Congress and the President
to use a Congressional-Executive agreement may not be justiciable. The legality of the law
approving NAFTA was challenged by a group of plaintiffs who contended that NAFTA was void
because it had not been consented to by a two-thirds Senate vote. The plaintiffs lost in the U.S.
district court, but then that decision was ordered vacated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th
Circuit on the grounds that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question.27

Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Treaty-Making Power, 26
ASIL PROC. 249, 252 (1932) (footnote omitted).
26

ACKERMAN & GOLOVE, supra note 22, at 91, 94; 22 USCS §286 (2004).

27

Made in the USA Foundation et al. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (1999), vacated by 242

F.3d 1300, 1319-20 (2001), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1039 (2001).
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No case before the Supreme Court has examined the constitutionality of the ex post form of
Congressional-Executive agreement. Nevertheless, an important development recently occurred in
the Supreme Court’s Garamendi decision finding the preemption of state law by an international
agreement.28 The Court stated that “. . . our cases have recognized that the President has authority
to make ‘executive agreements’ with other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or
approval by Congress, this power having been exercised since the early years of the Republic.”29
None of the authorities cited in the Court’s opinion involved Congressional-Executive agreements
specifically approved by Congress. Moreover, the executive agreement at issue in Garamendi had
not been approved by Congress. Thus, the dicta in Garamendi about no “approval by Congress”
might have little weight on that issue. And yet that statement by the Court breaks new ground in
seeing “approval by Congress” as a parallel to “ratification by the Senate.” The dissent also has
noteworthy dicta. Garamendi was a 5-4 decision, with the dissenters opposing preemption. In a
footnote, the dissent quotes Louis Henkin as stating that “there are agreements which the President
can make on his sole authority and others which he can make only with the consent of the Senate
(or of both houses), but neither Justice Sutherland [in United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L.

28

American Insurance Association et al. v. John Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) [hereinafter

“Garamendi”]. The issue in the case was whether a U.S. agreement with Germany regarding
Holocaust claims preempted California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act. The Court found
preemption. See Brandon P. Denning, International Decisions, American Insurance Ass’n v.
Garamendi, and Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 97 AJIL 950 (2003).
29

Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415.

13

Ed. 1134, 57 S. Ct. 758 (1937)] nor any one else has told us which are which.”30 The appearance of
this footnote might be read as a judicial acknowledgement of Congressional competence to
“consent” to international agreements.
The constitutionality of the Congressional-Executive agreement in the ex post form has been
debated for years. One of the earliest critics was Edwin Borchard in the 1940s who distinguished
agreements sanctioned by Congress following a negotiation from agreements that are pre-authorized
by Congress. Borchard denied the validity of the ex post form while seeming to accept the ex ante
form in certain circumstances.31 When the same Constitutional issue arose in the early 1990s during
Congressional consideration of the WTO, some critics took the position that Congressional approval
of a trade agreement could not substitute for a two-thirds vote in the Senate on a resolution of treaty
ratification.32
The scholar who received the most attention was Laurence H. Tribe who argued that the ex
post form of Congressional-Executive agreement was not constitutionally proper even though an ex
ante delegation by Congress to the President can enable the President to conclude certain

30

Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 430, 436 n. 3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This footnote in the dissenting

opinion refers to: LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 222
(2nd ed. 1996).
31

Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements–A Reply, 54 YALE L. J. 616, 621-22 & n. 24,

653 (1945). Borchard saw no justification in the Constitution for a power of Congress to sanction,
approve, validate or ratify international agreements.
32

For a summary of the debate, see Detlev F. Vagts, The Exclusive Treaty Power Revisited, 89 AJIL

40 (1995).

14

international agreements.33 Although any capsulization of Tribe’s nuanced analysis would not do it
justice, his most salient objection seems to be the textual one that Congressional power to give ex
post approval to international agreements is not specifically listed in the Constitution. Tribe is right
about that, and yet the Constitution is similarly silent on whether the Congress may give ex ante
agreement-making authority. If textual silence precludes ex post approval, then why doesn’t it also
preclude ex ante approval? Tribe further argues that if it were true that Congress may approve an
international agreement by law, then Congress, by overriding a President’s veto, would have a path
for “ratifying any such international agreement even over the President’s vehement objection,” and
such a result would be “dramatically at odds with the well-accepted principle that the President is
the primary representative of the nation in foreign affairs.”34 The problem with this argument,
however, is that only the President may ratify an international agreement.35 The Congress itself
cannot ratify a treaty or demand that the President do so.
A Congressional competence to give ex post approval to an international agreement would
seem to be conceptually intertwined with the power of Congress to give advance authorization for

33

Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in

Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1234-35 n. 47, 1258, 1261, 1269-70, 127778 (1995). An extensive response to Tribe’s thesis appears in David M. Golove, Against FreeForm Formalism, 73 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1791 (1998).
34

Tribe, supra note 33, at 1254.

35

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20 § 312 cmt. j.

15

the same agreement.36 The logic of representative government is in some tension with the claim
that Congressional authorization for an international agreement must occur before the President
negotiates it, and may not occur after the Congress has read it. Both the ex ante and ex post forms
of Congressional-Executive agreement stem from the same premise that the Article II Senate
consent procedure is not the exclusive means of enabling the United States to enter into an
international agreement.
No contemporary scholarship has come to my attention arguing that Senate consent via
Article II is a precondition for the United States to enter into any international agreement. Rather,
the debate has been whether there are some agreements that must receive consent from two-thirds of
the Senate.
One apparent limitation is that an international agreement containing a commitment for
action beyond Congress’s legislative powers would have to be an Article II treaty. As Detlev F.

36

See Detlev F. Vagts, International Agreements, the Senate and the Constitution, 36 COLUM. J.

TRANSNAT’L L. 143, 148 (1998); David Sloss, International Agreements and the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1963, 1992 (2003) (explaining that ex post agreements
are ex ante in a Constitutional sense because Congressional approval takes place before the
President makes a binding commitment). Perhaps the earliest scholarship to question the
before/after distinction is the seminal study, Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National
Policy, Part 1, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 199-200 n. 22 (1945) (“One wonders again where constitutional
basis can be found for introducing a time element—valid before Presidential action, invalid after
Presidential action—into Congress’s powers to authorize or sanction international agreements
within the scope of its competence.”).

16

Vagts has noted, proponents of Congressional-Executive agreements have always conceded that any
such agreement must be justifiable under a Congressional power to enact legislation.37 Yet that
constraint does not illuminate a clear line because the delineation of Congress’s enumerated
legislative powers remains contested, especially in an era in which the Supreme Court is narrowing
the limits on when federal law can oust state governmental authority.38
Further delineation may hinge on the significance of the international agreement at issue.
Several analysts have posited that the importance of an international agreement, its permanence, or
its potential impact on U.S. sovereignty may require that such an agreement obtain consent from
two-thirds of the Senate. For example, Louis Henkin stated that “[t]he constitutionality of the
Congressional-Executive agreement is established . . . ,” but that “doubts might spark if it were used
for an agreement traditionally dealt with by treaty and that seems to ask for the additional ‘dignity’
of a treaty, for example, a major alliance or disarmament agreement.”39 Laurence H. Tribe
37

Vagts, supra note 36, at 147. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20 § 303(2) and the

quotation above from McDougal and Lans, supra note 36.
38

See Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403

(2003) (discussing the recent cases).
39

HENKIN, supra note 30, at 217. The reference to “dignity” comes from Altman case where the

Supreme Court decided that the term “treaty” in a jurisdictional statute also encompassed a
commercial agreement that had been pre-authorized by the Congress yet “was not a treaty
possessing the dignity of one requiring ratification by the Senate . . . .” B. Altman & Co. v. United
States, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912). The Altman Court thus implicitly acknowledged the existence of
a class of U.S. international compacts that did not require consent by the Senate. The implications
of this holding for facilitating U.S. international agreements was recognized immediately by the

17

explained that “In deciding whether an international agreement is of the type into . . . which the
President may not enter without the consent of a Senate supermajority, one must consider the
degree to which an agreement constrains federal or state sovereignty and submits United States
citizens or political entities to the authority of bodies wholly or partially separate from the ordinary
arms of federal or state government.”40 Andrew T. Hyman postulated that any significant long-term
international compact must be treated as an Article II treaty.41 These assorted claims about the
exclusivity of Article II are derived from the Constitutional text and the original intent of the
framers regarding a special Senate role as adviser to the President and as institutional guardian of
the states. Moreover, as Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband have noted, the two-thirds
requirement and its formulation suggests that the framers of the Constitution “wanted important
international commitments made by a process requiring a higher degree of consensus than is needed
to pass an ordinary law.”42
Nevertheless, an originalist intent about Senate advice and consent needs to be considered in
light of the evolving practice over the next two centuries of effectuating many international

editors of the AJIL. Applicability of the Case of Altman v. The United States to Special Agreements
Concluded under a General Treaty of Arbitration, 6 AJIL 716 (1912).
40

Tribe, supra note 33, at 1268.

41

Andrew T. Hyman, The Unconstitutionality of Long-term Nuclear Pacts that are Rejected by One-

Third of the Senate, 23 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 313, 316-17 (1995). The framework statute for
the negotiation of nuclear pacts is 42 USCS 2153 (2004).
42

THOMAS M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 144 (1979).

18

agreements without use of Article II’s formal procedures.43 As early as 1792, in a law that gave
birth to the ex ante Congressional-Executive agreement, the Congress provided authority to the
Postmaster General to make arrangements with other countries.44 By the late 19th century, the use
of such advance authority became more frequent as did actions by the President to enter into
international agreements based on sole executive authority. Such non-use of Senate advice and
consent was rationalized by a doctrine that a U.S. international agreement not going through the
Article II process was not a “treaty” under that provision even while serving as a treaty under
international law.
This doctrine and the practice it reflects answers my first question posed above. The
modern Congressional-Executive agreement may validly serve as a substitute for the Article II
procedure. Employing a Congressional-Executive agreement does not transgress the Constitution’s
separation of powers. Certainly, it does not reduce the power of the Senate because no agreement
can be authorized ex ante or approved ex post without the concurrence of the Senate.45 To be sure,
such procedures may undercut the clout of individual senators to delay a Senate treaty vote, but the
Senate’s tolerance for such obstructionism is hardly required by the Constitution.

43

See Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV.

961, 1009 (2001) (presenting a theory of constitutional increments).
44

An Act to establish the post-office and post-roads within the United States, 1 Stat. 232, 239

(1792).
45

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20 § 303 reporters’ note 8. Of course, Senate approval of

an agreement by a majority vote does not legitimize the process if one believes that the Senate has a
Constitutional responsibility to approve agreements by a two-thirds vote.

19

The second question—how far can we go with the method now used for trade agreements—
also requires a complex constitutional inquiry. The most extensive analysis was authored by John
C. Yoo and published in 2001.46 Yoo argues that a Congressional-Executive agreement cannot be
used when the federal government reaches an agreement on matters outside of the Congressional
powers identified in Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution or on matters in which the President
and Congress possess concurrent and potentially conflicting powers.47 Based on this theory, Yoo
states that Congressional-Executive agreements ought to be used for agreements on international
trade, finance, and intellectual property, but cannot be used for agreements on human rights,
extradition, political-military issues, and arms control.48 He sees environment as lying in-between
depending on the substance of a particular agreement.49
Both Yoo’s theory and its application to particular agreements are contestable; yet even in
its formulation, the theory provides capacious opportunities for using Congressional-Executive
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agreements in many areas where they are not currently used. For example, under Yoo’s theory,
Congressional-Executive agreements would be doable for issues such as investment, intellectual
property, and some environmental agreements. Whether Yoo has been too cautious in ruling out
Congressional-Executive agreements for human rights is a matter deserving future analysis.
The use of legislation to approve trade agreements is sometimes said to be warranted by the
Constitutional rule that bills for raising revenue are to originate in the U.S. House of
Representatives.50 Although Article II lacks any textual basis for such a claim, the more devastating
critique is that, far from justifying the singularity of trade agreements, this argument opens the door
to legislative approval of any revenue-related international agreement. For example, tax treaties
might be approved by Congressional-Executive agreement rather than by Senate advice and consent
as they are now.
Another defense for special treatment of trade agreements is “tradition.” Trade truly is
distinguishable from other fields in that there is a tradition of processing trade agreements through
the House-Senate route.51 Other fields like environment and labor do not enjoy that tradition.
Nevertheless, all traditions begin at some point. The fact that the current crop of FTAs include
environment and labor commitments may itself be rooting a new tradition of doing without Senate
advice and consent for those issues.
The tradition in U.S. trade policy of circumventing the Senate treaty process began because
the Senate recognized the disjunction between its authority to consent to a trade treaty and its
dependence on the House to initiate legislation to implement the agreement. The initial solution
reached was to enact a law giving the President ex ante authority to enter into trade agreements.
50

U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, cl. 1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20 § 303 reporters’ note 9.

51

Vagts, supra note 32, at 41.

21

This solution worked for many decades, until the nature of trade agreements expanded to include
nontariff issues. Congress responded to this new development by restructuring the process to an ex
post one whereby a completed trade agreement is put up for a two-house vote.
The same imperatives that led to the use of Congressional-Executive agreements on trade
have now become just as pressing for many other international issues where Senate advice and
consent is insufficient for the President to carry out a treaty. The challenge of Congressional
implementation of treaties was not fully thought through by the framers of the Constitution.52
Nevertheless, they wrote a Constitution dynamic enough to permit elected officials to devise a
solution through the evolution of practice. That solution is the Congressional-Executive Agreement
which uses a single legal instrument to achieve the dual purposes of treaty approval and
implementation.
III. DEMOCRATIC ACCEPTABILITY
Since 1990, some observers have challenged as undemocratic the use of fast-track
procedures to approve trade agreements.53 Critics object to Congressional rules that forbid
amendments to the proposed implementing legislation, and that provide automatic House and
Senate votes. For example, during the 1994 Senate debate on approving the WTO Agreement,
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Senator Robert C. Byrd lamented “the rape of the legislative process by the fast-track procedures”
and called these procedures “destructive of the sovereignty of the people of this Republic.”54
Even if it is true that fast-track procedures do reduce democracy in one metric, this line of
criticism errs by considering the issue too narrowly. Democracy is not just a fixed set of
procedures. It is a method of government that enables the public to achieve its collective will. The
quality of democracy will be a function both of the representativeness of decisionmakers and the
effectiveness of decisionmaking processes. The procedures employed for trade agreements offer
several pro-democratic advantages over the procedures typically used in Article II treaties. One can
see this by examining three distinct phases of the treatymaking process—international negotiation,
treaty approval, and domestic implementation.
The first phase is international negotiation. Although prudent Presidents contemplating
treaties will seek and listen to the guidance of the Senate, regularized modalities often do not exist
to gain Senate input. As a result, the views of the President and the Senate may not mesh.
Recall the most famous episode of Senate obstruction, the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles.
The key counsel from the Senate was the “Round Robin” signed by 37 Republican senators on
March 4, 1919.55 This resolution by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge called for finalizing a peace treaty
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before taking up the League of Nations. Lodge’s short resolution was offered almost two months
after the Paris peace talks had begun, and was not voted on by the Senate. If, instead, President
Woodrow Wilson had solicited senatorial guidance a timely manner, perhaps the Senate’s
Weltanschauung and Wilson’s actions would have been better aligned. When significant Senate
advice was ultimately given, it bubbled up in the form of numerous “reservations” formulated well
after the treaty was signed in June. Although the decades after 1919 have brought much better
channels of communication between the President and the Senate, some chronic deficiencies persist.
Fast forward to July 1997: Several years into the process of negotiating national
commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the Senate voted 95-0 for the Byrd-Hagel
resolution.56 This resolution states that the United States should not be a signatory to an emissions
protocol that fails to include commitments for developing countries or that would seriously harm
the U.S. economy.57 To be sure, Byrd-Hagel was better than the 1919 Round Robin in having been
voted on by the Senate in advance of the negotiations in Kyoto that were expected to finalize the
Protocol. Nevertheless, Byrd-Hagel seems a flawed way for the Senate to formulate and
communicate U.S. negotiating objectives, especially in comparison to Trade Promotion Authority.
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Consider several key differences: Trade Promotion Authority is a law passed by both
houses while Byrd-Hagel is a resolution approved only by the Senate. In Trade Promotion
Authority, the Congress gave the Administration a negotiating mandate with detailed objectives to
be pursued in forthcoming negotiations. By contrast, in Byrd-Hagel, the Senate merely told the
Administration what not to do. No backdrop law setting specific U.S. objectives for climate
negotiations existed at that time58—and still does not! In Trade Promotion Authority, the entire
Congress acted positively to empower the President and the U.S. Trade Representative by offering
them a pathway for implementing a trade agreement. Yet in Byrd-Hagel, there was no operational
mandate, unless one counts the gratuitous directive to the U.S. Secretary of State to transmit a copy
of the resolution to the President.59 In Trade Promotion Authority, the Congress designed detailed
procedures for Executive branch consultations with relevant Congressional committees and
committee leadership at every stage in the process.60 Moreover, members of Congress participate
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as advisers during trade negotiations.61 By contrast for climate change, the Congressional
participation is less formalized.62
Is the Byrd-Hagel approach for shaping international negotiations more “democratic” than
Trade Promotion Authority? Perhaps the estimable Senator Byrd thinks so. Yet in my view, ByrdHagel is far less democratic both in not being bicameral and in not making a constructive
contribution toward achieving what the U.S. public seems to want63—a workable international
regime to prevent global climate change.
The Byrd-Hagel resolution exemplifies the chronic deficiencies in the “advice” half of
Senate “advice and consent.” Usually, the counsel given is informal, from individual senators
rather than from the Senate. When guidance does come from the Senate as in Byrd-Hagel, the
guidance may be too-little, too-late.
Very often, what is missing is an effective process for lawmakers to offer advice to the
President in advance. The important role of regular Congressional input on foreign policy was
expressed well in the dictum that Senator Arthur Vandenberg offered President Harry S Truman in
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1947: “If you expect us with you on the landing, Mr. President, you need us with you on the
takeoff.”64
Under Trade Promotion Authority, the Congress stands with the President on takeoff and
hopefully also on landing. The framework statute helps to overcome the centrifugal forces of
Article II which sometimes pull the President and Senate apart and lead them to insist upon their
prerogatives. Even Edwin Borchard—perhaps the most energetic academic opponent of replacing
treaties with executive agreements—recognized that bringing the U.S. House of Representatives
into the approval process could provide an opportunity for enhancing consultation during the
making of treaties.65
Another benefit of the trade mechanism is that the negotiating objectives set by Congress are
transparent to the U.S. public and to the world. By contrast, in other issue areas, the United States
often goes into multilateral negotiations without Congressionally-set objectives. In such situations,
the President and his Administration will determine the U.S. position, but may not do so in a
transparent manner and with adequate accountability to the Congress and the public.66
The second of the three phases is treaty approval. Trade agreements are guaranteed a
Congressional vote; treaties considered for Senate consent are not. Moreover, Senate procedures
have many awkward features. For example, a practice has developed of including within the
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resolution of ratification certain declarations that purport to govern how the treaty interacts with
domestic law.67 This practice is certainly not inscribed in the Constitution and seems undemocratic
in comparison to having the entire Congress deal with issues of domestic effect, as is done with
trade agreements.68
The third phase is treaty implementation. Even when the Senate has consented to a treaty or
would consent, the United States may fail to become a party because of a lack of implementing
legislation. The adoption of implementing legislation will often be a challenge because it requires
agreement on the same text by the House, the Senate, and the President.
Not all treaties need implementing legislation.69 Yet many do, and it is with those that the
Senate’s consent role in Article II can fall out-of-sync with the Congress’s legislative role in Article
I. In the future, international agreements may increasingly interpenetrate domestic law in difficult
areas like application to the states and judicial enforcement of individual rights.
Because contemporary trade agreements will always require implementation, the Congress
and President have worked together to devise expedited procedures to secure an up-or-down vote on
such legislation. Although Congress helps to draft the implementing bill, the ultimate sign-off is
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with the President to assure that the legislation will be acceptable to him. The non-amendability of
the bill avoids the possibility that the House and Senate might not reach a final vote because of
unresolved differences. The trade procedures blend a constructivist role for the Congress at the
initiation of new policy with a parliamentary-style following the completion of negotiations.
The reason that the procedures for international agreements may validly differ from the
regular order for domestic legislation is that the United States is part of a larger world. Although
“We, the People” of the United States can ultimately control what the U.S. government does, we
lack that authority with the other 191 governments. This leads to a basic conundrum for selfgovernment which is that internal democracy is necessarily incomplete whenever there are public
needs requiring international cooperation.70 A recognition of this interdependence71 adds texture to
our understanding of U.S. constitutional democracy.
U.S. citizens seeking to influence the direction of the trading system will benefit from
increasing the capacity of the U.S. government to work with the world. Without a clear legislative
path for approving and implementing a new trade agreement, the President will be handicapped in
negotiating with other governments. By contrast, when a fast track mechanism is available, the
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U.S. public has a better chance to succeed through the President in securing needed cooperation
from other countries. Surely that posture enhances the quality of American democracy.
The unique role of the United States in world affairs makes this case even stronger. Because
of the bigness of the United States, other countries regularly look to it for leadership. Yet too often
the United States fails the international community because, other than in trade, its cumbersome
procedures for treatymaking do not match its global leadership aspirations.
Whenever existing U.S. law does not meet the requirements of new trade agreements, the
implementing legislation proposed by the President makes the requisite statutory changes. For any
FTA, there will be changes required in U.S. tariffs. Yet because trade agreements embrace nontrade issues, there may also be provisions in domestic law that have to be revised. When the
Congress approved and implemented the NAFTA and WTO agreements in the early 1990s, there
were many such changes accomplished.72 The post-2002 FTAs, by contrast, have not necessitated
many substantive alterations in U.S. domestic law.
Critics of trade fast track sometimes worry that a hurried Congress will merely rubberstamp
a bad international agreement, and that this possibility undermines U.S. democracy. The concern is
justifiable, and needs to be addressed by assuring that the framework statute assigns Congress a
significant consultative role. Moreover, one should not forget that Congress commits only to vote
on and not necessarily to approve a proposed trade agreement.
The Congressional consideration of the Singapore and Chile FTAs in 2003 provides an
example of how the process proved flexible enough to accommodate last-minute adjustments. Each

72

See North America Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat.

2057 (1993); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). The
Uruguay Round of negotiations led to the establishment of the WTO.

30

of these FTAs promised a specific number of U.S. entry visas for business persons. When the draft
implementing legislation was being reviewed by the Congress, the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees objected to the draft because it would have granted the visas outside of the overall U.S.
quota. Recognizing that it had gone too far, the Administration accepted a change in the draft
legislation to earmark the visas within the existing quota.73
In addition to showing that the implementation process is not a rubber stamp, this episode
also points to some possible boundaries in using fast-track procedures to alter domestic law. In
response to the contretemps, the Senate passed a resolution stating that “future trade agreements to
which the United States is a party and the legislation implementing the agreements should not
contain immigration-related provisions.”74 The resolution was not clear, however, as to whether the
perceived problem was that immigration was being negotiated in an international agreement or that
a trade agreement was being used to set U.S. immigration policy.
IV. THE CENTRALITY OF A FRAMEWORK STATUTE
In the second edition of Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution (1996), Louis
Henkin writes that “the constitutionality of the Congressional-Executive agreement seems
established, it is used regularly at least for trade and postal agreements, and remains available to the
President for wide, even general use should the treaty process again prove difficult,” provided that a
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majority of the Senate is willing.75 In another book he authored, Henkin suggests that “it may be
time for the two houses to seek—at least—to develop a general principle for identifying
international agreements that might be sent to both houses for approval rather than to the Senate
alone.”76 In this comment, I call for Congress identify other international issues besides trade that
would benefit from a bicameral approval procedure.
The essence of the modern Congressional-Executive agreement is a forward-looking process
whereby the Congress votes to authorize the President to negotiate under certain conditions and
then puts to a vote any agreement submitted. The two Congressional decisions on each end provide
the trusses of a more democratic architecture for U.S. treatymaking. This architecture blends the
benefits of Presidential leadership with Congressional oversight over U.S. international
commitments.
The ordering of mandate first and approval second is not required by the Constitution. What
does depend on this order, however, is the political practicality of replicating the trade agreement
experience in other areas of international law. The trade process has succeeded because all the
players share the expectation that the framework of two-house approval will be used in place of
Senate advise and consent.77 Such expectations can only apply to future actions. That is why I am
not suggesting that the Congress take some dusty treaties off the Senate’s shelf, and consider an ad
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hoc law to approve them. The two-house procedure is most legitimate when applied prospectively
pursuant to a framework statute.
The idea of a “framework” statute was conceptualized in 1976 by Gerhard Casper.78 Casper
pointed to the War Powers Resolution and the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
as examples of law that “interprets the Constitution by providing a legal framework for the
governmental decisionmaking process.”79 He explained that a framework statute does not formulate
specific policies for the resolution of specific problems, but rather attempts to implement
constitutional policies. In Casper’s vision, the purpose of a framework statute is to regulate
decisionmaking and add stability to the relationship between the President and Congress.
Building on Casper’s insight 14 years later, Harold Hongju Koh emphasized the constructive
potential of “framework” legislation on national security matters.80 Koh suggested that such a
statute should “acknowledge the executive’s leading constitutional role in foreign affairs, at the
same time as it seeks to reduce the isolation that currently surrounds executive branch deliberations,
and to increase congressional-executive dialogue while foreign policy objectives are being set and
initiatives implemented.”81 Although he did not specifically endorse the idea of enacting framework
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statutes for other topics, Koh called for “centralizing congressional procedures for deciding whether
particular substantive agreements should be ratified by treaty or executive agreement.”82
In my view, the Senate and House should use a framework statute for many topics of
international agreement that could then bypass the Senate’s creaky advice and consent process.83
The practice of doing this for trade and almost nowhere else is unjustifiable, especially as U.S. trade
agreements increasingly incorporate non-trade issues.84 Recall the reasons stated by President Bush
as to why he wanted Trade Promotion Authority—the need to speak with a single voice and the
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value of an honest and open dialog with other governments. This same situation exists in other
fields of international law, and yet no specialized “Promotion Authority” is available for U.S.
international objectives other than trade.
One example of where a framework law could have been useful was the drafting of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), where U.S. negotiators lacked transparent
negotiating objectives. The Congress did not get around to passing a framework law on the ICC
until over four years after the Rome Statute was adopted. That law—the American
Servicemember’s Protection Act—is essentially reactive and encourages the President to negotiate
bilateral agreements with other countries to safeguard U.S. personnel from the ICC’s grasp.85
An advance negotiating mandate from the Congress is especially important in the most
delicate area of U.S. treatymaking, that is, when the United States promises to make significant
changes in its domestic law. This result may occur by design in trade negotiations, as happened
with NAFTA and the WTO. In such situations, the Congress uses implementing legislation to
conform U.S. law to the trade agreement. Yet in other fields that lack a framework statute, the
process often operates in reverse. U.S. negotiators may resist provisions in new international
agreements that require changes in U.S. law. In effect, U.S. negotiators aim to conform the protean
treaty to existing domestic law.
The framework approach used in trade can be deployed in a variety of ways. It can be used
to guide U.S. participation in specialized international organizations (e.g., the World Health
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Organization), in autonomous institutional arrangements (e.g., the ozone regime), and in
transgovernmental fora (e.g., the G-8). It can also be used when a new series of bilateral
agreements is contemplated (e.g., extradition).
Although Trade Promotion Authority serves as a useful prototype, the framework statute for
each issue area needs to be individualized. Perhaps the most significant variable is the amount of
substantive decisionmaking called for in the national implementation of a new treaty. The recent
U.S. FTAs have been on the low end of the scale with little discretion left to the parties. Climate
change lies on the high end because under the Kyoto Protocol each party retains considerable
flexibility as to how to comply with the emissions target. When a treaty combines substantive
obligations with low “prescriptiveness” on how to achieve them, the rapid Congressional
procedures used for trade would not be transferable without significant modification.
Another design feature to explore is whether to require more than a simple majority vote in
the Congress to approve a particular kind of international agreement. Throughout the long debate
on the treaty approval process, most of the attention has surrounded the dichotomy between the
current two-thirds rule and a simple majority of both houses.86 Nevertheless, those are not the only
choices available. The special procedures for approving trade agreements require a simple majority
in each house, and yet that percentage may be raised by changing the House and Senate rules in the
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Trade Promotion law. The main key to the success of these procedures has been the automatic upor-down vote in each house rather than the level of majority required.87

V. CONCLUSION
The blossoming of the modern Congressional-Executive agreement for trade negotiations
shows how constitutional practice can evolve to facilitate U.S. economic cooperation with other
countries. The practice of having separate tracks for Senate consent to a treaty and that treaty’s
implementation does not operate as effectively as using a single fast track to authorize negotiations
and then tee up a Congressional vote on approving and implementing the ensuing agreement. This
procedure works for trade because the Congress and the President have agreed to a framework to
codify the expectations that each branch has for the other’s behavior. The time has come to apply
the lessons of this trade law innovation to other important transborder and global challenges facing
the United States.
STEVE CHARNOVITZ
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